Bit of an uphill fight with captchas everywhere. Do people here conduct all online activity over VPN whenever possible? Only for the sensitive stuff? Or perhaps the inverse because the bank already knows you? Maybe when travelling or getting around region blocking? Something else?
The one provided by my work aside, I realized that I don’t have any consistent rules around using VPN. Except sometimes, you know, when downloading ISO’s for my favorite distos.


fonts, screen resolution, many things can affect fingerprint.
The solution is not “a browser from a reputable company.”
It will be a browser designed by security professionals to spoof fingerprints, along with a “crawler” that analyzes the current blend of fingerprints already out there, crawling not web pages but the request headers instead, and canvas outputs, etc.
I don’t think such a browser plus infrastructure exist yet, but they will. It is inevitable.
Such a browser will output garbage yet plausible and believable fingerprints that maximize ambiguity.
What makes you think the Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser are not made by “security professionals”? Have you used either of them? They already have defenses against font, screen resolution, and many other fingerprinting vectors.
Also, “plausible and believable” fingerprints were already considered by Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser, and I believe are actively in use by Brave Browser. I forget why Tor Browser and Mullvad Browser opted to instead give everybody the same fingerprint, but there was a reason for it.
Of these Tor is the best for protecting identity, however Tor produces a recognizeably Tor-like fingerprint, which for my preference is not ideal.
So for example Tor browsers can all be denied access, because Tor, not the individual user, but the kind of browser used, can still be identified.
My ultimate latent goal isn’t to only protect the anonymity of a security-conscious user, but to poison all fingerprinting data so that the entire technique is abandoned as useless.
Adversarial methods like that won’t work. Google will know when their data starts getting poisoned. Their ad targeting will lose effectiveness, their profit margin impacted. And they will tweak and tighten their trackers until they can squeeze out a good fingerprint again. In the end Google simply rolls out Web Environment Integrity, and consumers won’t be able to use the web unless they prove their identity. If you want to fight big tech, this is the endgame they will push toward. If you want to play a cat and mouse game with big tech, big tech wins in the end since they have all the money.
Tor Browser recognizes this. So Tor Browser just erases any existing identifiers, while accepting that websites can identify Tor users and block them if they want. It’s a very explicit signal that “this is a user that cares about privacy”, and it’s up to the website to accept that user or not. If a website doesn’t care, then usually it will work fine in Tor Browser. If a website does care and tries to block Tor users, then Tor Browser doesn’t bother fighting it. There are better places for them to focus their energy.
Ultimately if you want the web to be private, the only solution is to convince everybody else to want the same. Websites won’t block privacy-seeking users, if everybody is a privacy-seeking user. Then, even big tech will have to concede.
Just fundamentally, to fight, you have want to win.
You are arguing to stop fighting on the basis of a supposedly improper desire. Wanting small bite sized things is proper. Wanting something audacious is not. Your kind of argument could work in theory if my desire is unserious. That’s just psychology, not technology.
The scariness and the capabilities of an adversary is never, on their own, a proper reason to not fight.
The valid reasons can be: a deeply reasoned and deeply felt long term change in priorities, or a tactical hiatus to rest, regroup, reload. These are completely internal affairs, meaning, a serious person cannot be casually argued either into or out of these. I would check in with my soul to know whether or not to fight. Not with strangers on the net.
People fight to satisfy a certain hunger, and not because it looks easy or is a popular thing.
But there’s strategy to this. What I’m saying is that it’s more productive for privacy advocates to spend their efforts convincing others that privacy is important, or pushing for privacy-friendly regulation, rather than trying to fight a war of attrition with big tech.
I don’t think what you’re saying here in this last reply competes with what I am saying.
It is both/and. Not either/or.
My strat combines naturally with using advocacy, electoralism, lying flat, malicious compliance methods, militancy, legal/beurocratic methods, economic methods, etc.
I am for all of these. Whatever works.
But ignoring the human relationship dimension and exclusively focusing on prosecuting tech, imo, is not a serious strategy.
Besides, someone who needs to hide their ID now should use Tor now. Someone who has a lower risk profile can afford a solution that aims to poison the well for the long term in preference to a better ID protection.
I am not doing anything illegal, I want to poison the well if I can. I still use Tor sometimes anyway. I want the whole fingerprinting industry to just go away.
Be careful what you wish for. As hardware attestation continues to spread, companies won’t need fingerprints to identify you. Though if you want, hardware attestation can be thought of as an unique and unforgeable fingerprint. Poisoning the well won’t work for it.
Just to clarify, hardware attestation is not bad in itself. It can be used by the user to secure their device (aka secure boot). It’s when third-parties try to use it, where it becomes a threat to privacy. Like a website asking for your hardware-attested device id.
Of course we don’t want to give our id to these third parties. But we need to convince everybody else to do the same. Because if everybody else gives up their id, then websites won’t care about the few “privacy extremists”. And those people will simply be locked out of the web.
But anyways, back to fingerprinting. I feel like the best way to get a sense of the scale of the issue, is to simply dive into the developer discussions around it. Look into mailing lists and feature discussions for Tor browser, Mullvad browser, and Brave. I guarantee you there are discussions around trying to make the browser look identical to the average user, and the challenges of doing so.
Again we’re back to bad fear-based logic.
You’re saying hardware attestation is a looming punishment for poisonin fingerprinting.
Wrong.
The enemy wants hardware attestation now, and they want it bad. Nothing you do or avoid doing can influence this because they, the enemy, are responding to their own hungers.
I repeat, there are only two valid reasons to stop prosecuting a fight, and this isn’t one of them.
You are offering an incorrect model of the enemy as a nanny who will try to shape my behavior in responce to my behavior. I “need” to please the nanny and I “need” to avoid pissing off the nanny. Your argument is designed for that sentiment: nanny-pleasing.
The correct model is one based on INTERESTS. The enemy has an interest in hardware attestation regardless of what we do or don’t do. They will prosecute their interests KNOWING those are deeply unpopular. Look at the Guardians Of Pedophiles party, the GOP in USA. They are unpopular. They are hated. They KNOW this. They keep trucking. Why? The INTEREST didn’t go away. The interest is not socially shaped, unfortunately (or fortunately?).